AuroraMed v0.5.0 is a synthetic-data pilot. See exactly what's built →

Trust Center

Architecture: pilot versus design

The pilot runs in the cloud with an on-site hub for outages. The designed system adds sealed on-site servers, a ledger of hashes and hardware hardening. The diagram marks which is which.

AuroraMed target architecture Clinic with sealed terminals connected to a closed on-site server. The server sends encrypted, signed backup bundles to cloud storage. Only hashes, consent records and audit records are written to a federated ledger. Everything shown is the design; the current pilot runs on a cloud hub. CLINIC (closed on-site loop) live feed live feed live feed Sealed thin-client terminals and tablets: no local patient data On-site server (one cabinet) Patient records · app tier · interface engine Local database = operational primary Audit chain · policy decisions · key custody DESIGNED · not yet built Wired printerno network print path Local backup DBsyncable replica Clinic supplies its own power and internet. Offline: the server keeps care running, including printing. encrypted, signed bundles Cloud backup hubStores ciphertext; clinic-to-clinic sync where allowedRead-side limiter trip pauses sync only, never care hashes · consent · audit only Federated ledger (spheres)One sphere per clinic or network; bridges between spheresPatient records are never written here Today: pilot cloud hubWorker + Durable Object per facility + D1 databaseSynthetic data only · v0.5.0IN THE PILOT

Solid elements run in the pilot. Dashed elements are designed and not built.

The pilot Pilot

  • Electron client and a tablet web build, over HTTPS and secure WebSockets.
  • A Cloudflare Worker with one Durable Object per facility for live fan-out and timers.
  • One database with a clinic identifier on every tenant table (test-enforced).
  • Additive-only migrations (28 so far).
  • An on-site hub on Node 22 and SQLite, built from the same worker code, with signed and encrypted replication to the cloud.
  • A server circuit that live-tests every module after each deploy.

The design Designed

  • A sealed, cabinet-sized on-site server per clinic as the operational primary (the on-site hub software exists; the sealed hardware and primary-copy role do not).
  • A federated ledger per clinic or network holding only hashes, consent and audit events.
  • Three backup copies on two media with one offsite and one offline (the pilot has verifiable backups and an isolated restore drill only).
  • Server-to-server transfer in three streams with hybrid post-quantum key exchange.

Safe degradation ladder

From normal operation down to full local-only. Downtime mode follows this ladder (L0 to L5) in the pilot. Some thresholds are open decisions.

Safe-mode ladder (L0 to L5)Six levels from normal operation to total site loss. At each level care continues locally as far as possible; cross-site features are reduced first. L0 NormalEverything available L1 WAN downFull local care; sync and ledger writes queue; cross-site transfers wait L2 Ledger downLocal care and local audit chain; high-risk actions need manual multi-person approval L3 Server partialRemaining node carries care; less critical modules go read-mostly L4 Server downDowntime mode: read-only emergency data set, paper forms, back-entry later L5 Site lostAlternate site with restored replica; paper until restored

Partly met today

The specification requires local operation without the network. The on-site hub and downtime mode were built to meet it and are tested on synthetic data, but the pilot’s main hub is in the cloud, a replication conflict has no resolution screen, and no site drill has been run.

Architecture questions?

The help center has answers to the hard ones.

See the synthetic-data demo first.Request a demo