Trust Center
Architecture deep-dive
Diagrams for the pilot as it runs today (v0.5.0) and for the design that is still ahead. Solid outlines run in the pilot; dashed outlines are designed and not built.
1. The pilot as built
Diagram: the v0.5.0 pilot. One shared hub serves four synthetic tenants (three on all 36 pieces, one Small Clinic preset with 25); cross-tenant access was refused in every test.
- Field-level AES-GCM encryption for national IDs, MFA secrets and registration change history, under a hub secret.
- Sessions are random 256-bit bearer tokens stored only as hashes, and are revocable.
- Migrations are additive only, and a unit test forbids dropping or deleting.
- The on-site hub runs the same worker source on Node 22 with SQLite, built with esbuild, so cloud and site share one code base.
- Only the pieces a customer selects are compiled into that customer’s app and worker.
- After every deploy a server circuit proves each piece with a live self-test; see the server circuit page.
2. The clinic: built and still designed
Diagram: the small-clinic deployment. Solid boxes are built; dashed boxes are designed. Larger sites would use multi-node clusters, which are not built.
- The on-site hub lets the clinic keep working when the cloud is unreachable. Whether the on-site copy becomes the operational primary, with the cloud as an encrypted backup replica, is a design intent and not a tested deployment.
- Patient records are never written to the ledger, so correction and deletion rights can be honoured where law allows.
- Sync bundles are signed, hash-chained, AES-256-GCM encrypted and sequence-numbered, and padded. They are built; the signing keys are demo-grade and custody is an open owner decision.
- An independently created duplicate record is a conflict that pauses sync. The screen to resolve it is not built.
3. Network zones
Diagram: the zone model. Flow rules are in the design document; no network has been built to it.
4. Key hierarchy and data protection
Diagram: envelope encryption in the design. Rotation intervals are open; the pilot has one hub key and no rotation.
- Small sites may use a TPM-sealed or smartcard custody; the large tier calls for an HSM with a validated level still to be confirmed.
- Erasing a patient means destroying the keys by quorum, writing a tombstone and verifying the data is undecryptable. Whether that counts as erasure is pending legal opinion.
5. Audit, backup and safe degradation
Diagram: designed. The pilot has a hash chain and a verify button but no batching or anchor.
Diagram: the pattern is designed. The pilot has a verifiable backup (per-table digests, signed manifest) and an isolated restore drill; promoting a restore records a dual-authorised decision only. No off-site or immutable copy exists.
The safe-degradation ladder, from normal operation down to full local-only. Downtime mode built in Wave 3 follows a six-level ladder (L0 to L5) with role-based ceilings; some thresholds remain open owner decisions.
6. Transfer, limiter and the parts we cannot yet vouch for
Diagram: designed. Key exchange is hybrid classical and post-quantum in the design, and is not implemented or independently evaluated.
Least mature parts
The analog timing layer, camera-resistant screens and sealed terminals are untested hardware ideas. The design’s own goal is “unharvestable, not unhackable”, and we make no claim about their effectiveness. The read limiter’s window lengths and quotas, the scroll-lock threshold and the multi-key threshold are open decisions.
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