Security controls
Transfers, sync and limiters
Three-stream transfer, cloud sync and the read limiter.
How to read status labels: In the pilot (v0.5.0, synthetic data) Simulated in the pilot (no real external system) Designed, not yet built Open decision Not offered / no claim made Planned partner integration
C0187How does data move between clinics?
Through an authority record first, then a secret-shared package over three simultaneous streams with decoy padding, authenticated encryption and hybrid key exchange, verified by a hash on delivery. Designed, not built.
C0188Do decoys make data confidential?
No. Decoys raise the cost of traffic analysis only. Confidentiality comes from secret sharing and authenticated encryption.
C0189What is the secret-sharing threshold?
Open. Two of three is the recommendation, and the decoy ratio will be set by testing.
C0190What does the read-side limiter do?
It limits reads and pulls, not writes. In the pilot it is built with a log-only default and a quota of 240 reads per user per 60 seconds, and tripping it pauses only cloud sync, never local care. Hardware hardening, the final quota and oscillating windows are not built, and the quota is an open decision.
C0191What are the limiter numbers?
Open: window length, oscillation pattern, per-role and per-terminal quotas. Until set the design runs it in log-only mode with counters and a weekly reminder that values are unset.
C0192Will a busy morning clinic trip the limiter?
The quotas must be chosen against real clinical workloads so legitimate peaks do not trip it. That tuning has not been done.
C0193What is the scroll-rate lock?
A re-authentication prompt when history is paged faster than a threshold, computed on the server by information rendered, with lighter weights for result triage. Threshold is open.
C0194Can one person export all patients?
No. Individual bulk export is disabled and bulk operations need a quorum-approved workflow.
C0195How does a paused sync resume?
By two signers, with an audit entry. It is refused if the underlying integrity alarm remains unresolved. A replication conflict, such as an independently created duplicate record, also pauses sync, and no screen exists yet to resolve it.
C0196Are sync bundles tamper-proof?
They are built to be tamper-evident, not tamper-proof: each bundle is AES-256-GCM encrypted, HMAC-signed per site, hash-chained with gapless sequence numbers and padded. Anchoring the backup range on a ledger is designed, not built, and the site signing secrets are demo-grade.
C0197Does sync leak activity patterns?
Bundle size and timing can reveal activity. Bundles are padded, which gives limited protection, and timing jitter is not a claim. The design states the limit honestly.